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The twenty-ve year controversy surrounding the illegal status of medici-
nal marijuana, which remains unresolved, provides an excellent study of the
relationship between the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Drug En-
forcement Agency (DEA), and the courts. During this historical chronology the
agencies attempt to fulll their shared duties under the Controlled Substances
Act of 1970 (CSA), while the judiciary seeks to enforce principles of adminis-
trative law and the U.S. Constitution. Added to the diculty of dening the
boundary of each entity's power is the notion that dierent standards govern
the way each determines what is in the best interest of the American people
they serve. The following is a discussion of how legal principles and scientic
evidence have been, and are working together toward a resolution of the medical
marijuana debate.
Facts regarding the positives and negatives of marijuana inhalation, and an his-
torical account of the pre-1994 debates, lends pertinent background information
for understanding the recent actions of medicinal marijuana advocates.
Proponents (such as the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana
Laws (NORML) and the Marijuana Policy Project Foundation) and the United
States Government, as the major opponent agree, that marijuana has provided
1relief to persons with cancer, AIDS wasting syndrome, and glaucoma.1 Where
cancer is concerned marijuana has been used to alleviate symptoms of nausea
and excessive vomiting, while also enhancing the appetite which assists in the
maintaining of a stable body weight.2 It has provided relief of similar symptoms
in those suering from the AIDS wasting syndrome.3
Studies from the early 1970s demonstrate that marijuana's aect on glau-
coma, characterized by intense pressure within the eye which damages the optic
nerve, is to decrease the intraocular pressure in the eye.4 Proponents also al-
lege that it lessens tremors and the loss of muscle coordination in those with
multiple sclerosis, helps relieve the convulsions of persons with epilepsy, and
dissipates the pain and muscle spasms of those who suer from paraplegia and
quadriplegia.5
Marijuana advocates assert that the cigarette (illegal in the U.S.) has sev-
eral advantages over the FDA approved synthetic form of the drug delta-9-
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), marijuana's most active ingredient.6 THC is
1Department of Health & Human Services, Public Health Services, National Cancer In-
stitute Fact Sheet on the Therapeutic Use of Marijuana for Chemotherapy-Induced Nausea
and Vomiting; National Eye Institute Fact Sheet on the Therapeutic Use of Marijuana for
Glaucoma; National Institute On Allergy and Infectious Diseases Fact Sheet on the Thera-
peutic Use of Marijuana for Patients With HIV-Wasting Syndrome; provided by Dr. Judy
Lawrence Drug and Chemical Evaluation Section, Oce of Diversion Control, Drug Enforce-
ment Agency.
2National Cancer Institute Fact Sheet.
3 National Institute on Allergy and Infectious Diseases Fact Sheet.
4National Eye Institute Fact Sheet.
5Plainti's Opening Brief at 11-14, Dr. Marcus Conant v. Barry R. McCarey et al, U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, (January 1, 1997).
6Id. at 11-12.
2available in pill form by the brand name Marinol.7 For cancer patients, inhaled
marijuana is deemed better because oral medication often cannot be maintained
in the system until dissolved.8 In the late 1980s experts who testied in favor
of legalization before Administrative Law Judge Francis L. Young asserted that
cigarettes provide an instant eect, wherein activation of the pill requires hours.9
Thus because one can feel the eect while smoking, a patient is better able to
control dosage through a cigarette.10 Proponents have also asserted that the
unknown chemicals in the marijuana plant combine with the THC to improve
the therapeutic eect.11 Furthermore, it is argued that the plant is far cheaper
than the other drugs favored by marijuana opponents.12
Clinical research by doctors Steve Sallen and Norman Zinberg supports the
contention that smoked marijuana is preferable to Marinol.13 A study by Rick
Doblin and Mark Kleiman, drug policy researchers at Harvard's Kennedy School
of Government, demonstrates that a signicant percentage of oncologists be-
longing to the American Society of Clinical Oncology believe the same.14 In
fact they received responses from approximately ten percent of America's on-
7Id. at 11.
8Gregg A. Bilz, The Medical Use of Marijuana: The Politics of Medicine, 13 Hamline
Journal of Public Law & Policy 117, 127 (Spring 1992).
9Id. at 126-127.
10Id.
11Id. at 127.
12Interview with Rick Doblin, Director, Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Stud-
ies (MAPS), January 13, 1997.
13 S.E. Sallen et al., Antiemetic Eect of Delta-9-Tetrahydrocannabinol in Patients
Receiving Cancer Chemotherapy, 293 New England Journal of Medicine, 795 (1975).
14 Gregg A. Bilz, The Medical Use of Marijuana: The Politics of Medicine, 13
Hamline Journal of Public Law & Policy 117, 130 (Spring 1992).
3cologists. Forty-eight percent of these acknowledged that they would prescribe
marijuana cigarettes if it were legal, and forty-four of the oncologists admitted
that they had already recommended the illegal form of the drug.15 Based upon
this information proponents conclude that the illegality of plant marijuana hin-
ders the physician's ability to communicate and practice medicine.16
The U.S. Government purports a series of counter arguments. A fact sheet
published by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) asserts that National Cancer Institute sci-
entists disfavor the THC pill when compared with other antiemetics such as
ondansetron (brand name Zofran) used alone or together with dexamethasone
(a steroid hormone), or metoclopramide (brand name Reglan) together with
diphenhydramine and dexamethasone.17 The article also asserts that over 400
potential carcinogens are found in marijuana smoke, and research has demon-
strated that tobacco smoking HIV positive individuals have progressed to AIDS
quicker than non-smokers.18 Also, the cigarettes sold on the black market may
house disease-causing agents which would be harmful to patients with weaken-
ing immune systems.19
15 Id.
16Plaintis' Brief at 17-18, Conant (1997).
17National Cancer Institute Fact Sheet.
18Id.
19Id.
4Currently there are 24 FDA approved drugs for glaucoma.20 The National
Eye Institute admits that side eects may include headaches and respiratory
problems, and agrees that a drug may loose its eectiveness over time.21 How-
ever the variety of drugs provides a host of alternative treatments which have
been extended to include laser surgery and incisional surgery.22 The Eye In-
stitute's research of other potential glaucoma drugs has proven that merely de-
creasing intraocular pressure, an eect of smoked marijuana, is not guaranteed
to eliminate the disease.23 This HHS-Eye Institute study claims that
evidence supporting marijuana's use for the spasms and pain which accompany
multiple sclerosis are anecdotal rather than scientic in nature.24 The report
makes no mention of epilepsy, paraplegia, or quadriplegia, but a fact sheet pro-
duced by NIH and the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) asserts that
marijuana use may cause heart rate alteration, intense anxiety, or paranoia.25
Additional information critical to the debate, and stipulated by both sides, is
that clinical trials of the type that could lead to marijuana's New Drug Applica-
tion (NDA) status are not yet complete.26 Research at this level would enable
scientists to weigh the positive and negative components of marijuana therapy
and determine, through current technology, the extent to which the harmful
aects of marijuana could be eliminated, if at all.
20National Eye Institute Fact Sheet.
21Id.
22Id.
23Id.
24National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke Fact Sheet.
25The Facts About Marijuana, A Fact Sheet Prepared by NIDA and NIH; provided by Dr.
Judith Lawrence, Drug Enforcement Agency.
26Q's and A's on Medical Marijuana Policy, HHS; provided by Dr. Judith Lawrence, Drug
Enforcement Agency.
5Presently there is no federally funded medicinal marijuana research.27 Dr.
Donald Abrams (Chairman, Community Consortium, Assistant Director AIDS
Program San Francisco General Hospital, and Professor of Clinical Medicine
at the University of California San Francisco), a marijuana proponent eager
to conduct privately funded research, has been unable to secure a supply of
marijuana from NIDA (the only legal source of the drug in the U.S.) despite
FDA approval of his protocol under 21 U.S.C. x 823(f).28 This standstill has
been a reality since 1994 and became one of the catalysts which sparked the
California voter referendum that legalized medicinal marijuana at the state level.
A study of historical developments will enhance one's understanding
of a more detailed account of the current issues. Marijuana was declared a
prohibited substance in the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937.29 In the 1970 Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) it was classied as Schedule I. 21 U.S.C. x 812(b)(1)
denes such drugs as follows:
(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse.
(B) The drug or other substance has no currently accepted medical
use in treatment in the United States.
c  There is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance under
medical supervision.30
The characteristics of Schedule II drugs include:
(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse.
27Id.
28Dr. Donald Abrams, Letter to Alan Leshner Ph.D., Director of NIDA,
http://www.maps.org/mmj/abrams.html (visited Jan. 12, 1997).
29Bilz, Medical Use of Marijuana, 13 Hamline Journal of Public Law & Policy 117, 118
(Spring 1992).
3021 U.S.C. x 812(b)(1).
6(B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted medical use
in treatment in the United States or a currently accepted medical use with
severe restrictions.
c  Abuse of the drug or other substances may lead to severe psychological or
physical dependence.31
Since Schedule I drugs have no accepted medical use and are deemed unsafe
even with doctor supervision, domestic distribution is banned.32 Schedule II
drugs, however, do have medical value and may be prescribed. Thus medicinal
marijuana proponents have always battled for a change of schedule.
21 U.S.C.A. x 811(a)-(c) enables the Attorney General, the Secretary of
HHS, or any interested party to initiate a rescheduling. Regardless of who re-
quests the change, in addition to complying with the rulemaking procedures of
the Administrative Procedure Act, the DEA Administrator (to whom the At-
torney General has delegated her powers under the CSA33) must request from
the Secretary a scientic and medical evaluation, and her recommendations as
to whether the substance should be rescheduled.34 These recommendations are
binding on the DEA insofar as they address medical and scientic information.
If the Secretary recommends that a substance not be controlled, the statute
does not permit the DEA to control it. Aside from this power limitation, pro-
vided DEA has considered the HHS recommendations, the DEA has freedom to
determine whether the drug should be rescheduled.35
3121 U.S.C. x 812(b)(2).
32 Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law 536 (1991).
3328 C.F.R. x 0.100(b).
34 21 U.S.C.A. x 811(b)
35 Id.
7Litigation between the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws
(NORML) and the DEA from 1974 to 1994 demonstrates that the agencies gov-
erned by the CSA have, in some instances, evaded statutory requirements. It
also is evidence of the expected agency partiality to Presidential opinion. Dur-
ing these years it was the judiciary which insisted upon compliance with the
letter of the law.
Immediately prior to the litigation era NORML found an ally in the gov-
ernment's own National Commission on Marihuana. In 1972 the Commission
unleashed its report entitled, Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding.36 Its
recommended that marijuana be thoroughly researched for its potential medical
uses, that states which still recognized marijuana as a narcotic should change
their laws, and that possession of marijuana for personal use should not be a
federal oense.37President Nixon divorced himself from the Commission having
already decided that he was adamantly opposed to marijuana's legalization.38
Prior to the release of the report President Nixon declared, Even if the com-
mission does recommend that it [marijuana] be legalized, I will not follow the
recommendation.39
In line with the President the DEA denied NORML's rst request that mari-
36Bilz, Medical Use of Marijuana, 13 Hamline Journal of Public Law & Policy 117, 122
(Spring 1992).
37 Id., 122-123.
38Id.
39 Id.
8juana be recognized as having a medical value.40 The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit, in NORML v. Ingersoll, remanded the case because the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), the precursor of the DEA,
had refused to hold an administrative hearing as was required under 21 U.S.C.A.
x 811(a).41 The court asserted, it was not the kind of agency action that pro-
moted the kind of interchange and renement of views that is the lifeblood of a
sound administrative process.42
Following the hearing the DEA again rejected NORML's request for reschedul-
ing and the court, in NORML v. DEA, remanded. This time the DEA had not
referred the petition to the Secretary for medical and scientic evaluation and
recommendation as is required by 21 U.S.C.A. x 811(b).43 The petition was
still denied following HHS input, and the court again remanded because FDA
had not considered new evidence regarding possible medical uses of THC as
distinguished from the full marijuana plant.44
The D.C. Circuit's actions demonstrate a Court whose objective was to en-
sure statutory compliance. It realized, however, that it could not control the
agencies once they began evaluating scientic evidence behind closed doors.
Still, general court oversight has facilitated the advance of medicinal marijuana.
40 37 Fed. Reg. 10897 (Sept. 1, 1972).
41 NORMAL v. Ingersoll, 497 F.2d 654, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
42 Id. at 659.
43 NORML v. DEA, 559 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
44 NORML v. DEA, No. 79-1660 (D.C. Cir., October 16, 1980).
9The year after NORML v. DEA the FDA granted marijuana investigative new
drug (IND) status through its IND Compassionate Access Program.45 This
project enabled individuals to receive a legal supply of marijuana cigarettes
contingent upon a recommendation from their physicians.46 Following investi-
gation of synthetic THC, the government agreed to market the THC pill (brand
name Marinol) in 1985, and transferred this new drug from Schedule I to Sched-
ule II in April of 1986.47
There is additional evidence that the court was merely following its duty to
uphold the law as already established either by statute or by principles of ad-
ministrative law. In Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics (ACT) v. DEA, 930 F.
2d 936, 938-39 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the court sustained the DEA Administrator's
decision to reject Administrative Law Judge Francis Young's 1988 recommen-
dation that marijuana become a Schedule II drug.
Following a two year hearing Judge Young concluded,
It would be unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious for the DEA to continue
to stand between those suerers and the benet of this substance in light of the
evidence in this record.48
Yet despite this judge's determination that the DEA's policy was arbitrary
and capricious, usually an administrative law ground for invalidating an agency
action, the Circuit Court upheld the DEA Administrator's rationale for rejecting
Judge Young's decision.
45 Q's and A's on Medicinal Marijuana Policy, HHS Fact Sheet.
46 Id.
47 Bilz, Medical Uses of Marijuana, 13 Hamline Journal of Public Law & Policy
117, 124-125 (Spring 1992).
48 2 Robert C. Randall, Marijuana, Medicine, and the Law 445 (1989).
10The point of contention between Judge Young and the Administrator turned
upon what determines whether a drug has a currently accepted medical use, a
requirement for Schedule II status. Since the Circuit Court found the statutory
phrase ambiguous and its legislative history scant, it deemed rational the Ad-
ministrator's eight-point list of characteristics necessary for a substance to be
classied as having an accepted medical use.49 The Court made this determina-
tion in light of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984) (a court may not substitute its own construction of an
ambiguous statutory provision for an agency's reasonable interpretation if the
statute in question is one Congress enacted to establish the parameters of the
agency's activities).
Ironically, in ACT v. DEA after nding the eight-point test rational the
Court remanded the case for an explanation as to how [the test] had been uti-
lized by the Administrator in reaching his decision. The Court did this because
it felt three of the criteria were impossible for a Schedule I drug to meet.50 All
three had in common an assumption that the drug would be readily available,
a fact which was untrue for Schedule I substances.51 On remand the
Administrator asserted that two of the three criteria had not been relied upon in
the decision to refuse rescheduling. As for the third, he provided an explanation
which satised the Court that the agency's decision was still fair.52 In addition
49ACT v. DEA, 930 F.2d at 937 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
50ACT & NORML v. DEA, 15 F.3d 1131, 1133-1134 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
51Id.
52Id.
11he published in the Federal Register a Final Order listing only ve criteria which
must be met for a substance to be considered as having an accepted medical
use.53 Based upon the new list the Administrator again refused to alter mari-
juana scheduling. The change from the list of eight to the list of ve, without
notication to marijuana proponents, became the subject of the next appeal.
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit still considered the Administrator's
actions rational.54
Although court interference in analysis and interpretation of agency research
is minimal or none, HHS has on occasion increased research in response to Con-
gressional requests and popular pressure. In 1991, medicinal marijuana propo-
nents publicized the IND Compassionate Access Program as a no cost supply
of marijuana cigarettes for AIDS patients.55 Since the increased demand would
have depleted the national supply, then Assistant Secretary for Health, James
O. Mason, M.D., called for a policy review and further NIH research on mari-
juana's ecacy. During that time no action was taken on the new applications.56
NIH considered available research in order to determine marijuana's
aect on ve diseases. The study, presented in 1993 at the Ninth International
AIDS Conference in Berlin, revealed that marijuana provided no relief beyond
that of other already approved drugs.57 It also indicated a relationship between
53Id.
54 Id.
55HHS - Public Health Service Fact Sheet on Therapeutic Marijuana Policy, Jan. 12, 1994.
56Id.
57Id.
12smoked marijuana and bacterial pneumonia in HIV positive persons.58
As a result of these ndings, and the realization that the IND Compassion-
ate Access Program could not produce the type of research necessary to move
marijuana toward satisfaction of the FDA new drug application requirements
(NDA), the HHS Secretary closed the Program to new applicants and provided
them with information on other medications. The agency continued to supply
marijuana to its earlier patients which still desired it.59
Although the grassroots eort to publicize FDA dispersement of marijuana pro-
duced unfavorable results for the medical marijuana movement, pressure from
government insiders and agency negotiations with medical marijuana propo-
nents have also been ineective in the quest for legalization. An article by
Representative Newt Gingrich published in the March 19, 1982 issue of the
Journal of the American Medical Association commended the AMA's Coun-
cil on Scientic Aairs piece, Marihuana: Its Health Hazards and Therapeutic
Potential.60 However Mr. Gingrich did not hesitate to add,
Federal policies do not reect a factual or balanced assessment of marijuana's
use as a medicant. The Council, by thoroughly investigating the available ma-
terials, might well discover that its own assessment of marijuana's therapeutic
value has, in the past, been more than slightly shaded by federal policies that
are less than neutral.61
It is apparent that despite this article and the earlier discussed 1971 report by
the government's National Commission on Marihuana, federal agencies have not
58Id.
59Id.
60Bilz, 13 Hamline Journal of Public Law & Policy 117, 121-122.
61 Id.
13varied from their entrenched belief that any medicinal value found in marijuana
has already been located in other drugs.
A letter from Representative Barney Frank and other congressmen request-
ing a review of Dr. Mason's decision to close the Compassionate Access Program
did cause his successor, Dr. Philip Lee, to reconsider.62 Dr. Lee maintained his
predecessor's position and claimed that the grand error of the project was that
it could not yield the type of evidence necessary to suggest whether the FDA
should approve or disapprove of marijuana as a new drug.63
Even the attempt by advocates Valerie Corral and Elvy Musikka to negoti-
ate a moratorium on the prosecution of diseased persons arrested for possession
of marijuana has been unsuccessful. A letter from Assistant Attorney General
Jo Ann Harris reconrmed the current policy and declared that the Depart-
ment of Justice was not willing or able to grant the request. It also stated that
the Attorney General would not reverse the DEA Administrator's position that
marijuana is a Schedule I drug.64
The current dispute surrounding medical marijuana, which involves Dr. Donald
Abrams' research protocol, began with a challenge from former DEA Adminis-
trator Mr. Robert Bonner who declared,
62Rick Doblin, The Medicinal Use of Marijuana - A Progress Report On Dr. Don-
ald Abrams' Pilot Study Comparing Smoked Marijuana and the Oral THC Capsule for
the Promotion of Weight Gain In Patients Suering from the AIDS Wasting Syndrome,
http://www.maps.org/news-letters/v5n1/abrams.html (visited Jan. 12, 1997).
63 Id.
64 Id.
14Those who insist that marijuana has medical uses would serve society bet-
ter by promoting or sponsoring more legitimate scientic research, rather than
throwing their time, money and rhetoric into lobbying, public relations cam-
paigns and perennial litigation.65
In support of this statement both HHS and the Department of Justice (which
oversees DEA policy) have agreed that what is necessary are clinical trials.66
Such trials must produce scientic evidence warranting FDA approval of mari-
juana as a prescription drug. In fact the HHS published Question and Answers
on Medicinal Marijuana Policy provides,
Should a private group propose to do a study on the therapeutic use of
smoked marijuana, the FDA is prepared to follow its customary practice of
discussing with the potential sponsors of such a study the federal regulations
governing the use in humans of investigational new drug substances and the
requirements of approval for a new medication. FDA has a history of working
with Schedule I drugs for potential medical use.67
The FDA has demonstrated its commitment to this statement by granting
approval of Dr. Abrams protocol under 21 U.S.C.A. x 823(f) and 21 C.F.R.
x 1301.42.68 Yet this is only one of the requirements necessary to perform
research. Dr. Abrams also needs a legal supply of marijuana, and a DEA regis-
tration to possess and distribute the marijuana.69 As mentioned above, NIDA,
the organization with a monopoly on the government supply of marijuana, has
refused Dr. Abrams request for the drug because it claims Dr. Abrams did not
follow proper protocol.70
65 Id.
66 Q's and A's on Medicinal Marijuana, HHS.
67Id.
68Rick Doblin, The Medical Use of Marijuana, http://www.maps.org/news-
letters/v5n1/abrams.html (visited Jan. 12, 1997).
69 Q's and A's on Medicinal Marijuana Policy, HHS.
70Dr. Alan Leshner, Director NIDA, Letter to Dr. Donald Abrams,
15From an administrative law perspective the issue is to what extent can this
organization, which along with the FDA is under the wing of HHS, refuse to
release the marijuana? NIDA was established within the National Institute of
Mental Health, Health, Education, and Welfare Department by an act of March
21, 1972 (86 Stat. 85).71 It was then removed from within the National Institute
of Mental Health and became a part of the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental
Health Administration under a statute of May 14, 1974 (88 Stat. 136). Its
duties were next assigned to HHS by an October 17, 1979 act (93 Stat. 695).
The Institute was abolished on July 10, 1992 (106 Stat. 331), and reestablished
on July 10, 1992, again as part of HHS, under the Public Health Service Act
(106 Stat. 361, 42 U.S.C. x 285o).72
The general purpose of the Institute is,
[to] conduct and support biomedical and behavioral research, health services
research, research training, and health information dissemination with respect
to the prevention of drug abuse and the treatment of drug abusers.73
In addition to this statutory statement that NIDA's objective is to research
and assist development of drug abuse treatments, an
HHS fact sheet asserts, NIDA conducts research on the eects of drug abuse, it
does not study the possible medicinal eects of drugs.74
http://www.maps.org/mmj/leshner.html (visited Jan. 12, 1997).
71Richard L. Claypoole, & John W. Carlin, The United States Government Manual 774
(1996/1997).
72Id.
7342 U.S.C. x 285(o)(a) (1994).
74Q's and A's on Medicinal Marijuana Policy, HHS.
16Nevertheless, NIDA's director, Alan I. Leshner, Ph.D., made the following
statement in his letter of rejection to Dr. Abrams.
As you know, decisions for the commitment of limited NIH resources are
based upon scientic principles, so as to ensure the most eective use of our
research sources. Our decision here is based upon issues of design, scientic
merit and rationale. We believe that your study will not adequately answer the
question posed.75
Dr. Judith Lawrence (a Ph.D. in the DEA's Drug and Chemical Evaluation
Section of the Oce of Diversion Control) who has testied before Congress on
the marijuana issue, conrmed that NIDA's rejection was based upon its scarce
resources.76 She also held that NIDA was designed to do limited preliminary
research regarding drug abuse, and was not designed to supply the magnitude
of any drug needed for clinical trials of the type which lead to FDA new drug
application approval.77
Even the proponents of medical marijuana agree that usually once the FDA
has approved a protocol the researchers may conduct the studies.78 Only be-
cause NIDA is the sole supply of legal marijuana did Dr. Abrams have to
contact the Institute. Yet proponents also contend that NIDA has required
them to request the marijuana through a National Institute of Health (NIH)
grant application process.79 This process enables NIH to evaluate the ecacy
75Alan Leshner, Letter to Dr. Abrams, http://www.maps.org/mmj/leshner.html (visited
Jan. 12, 1997).
76Telephone interview with Dr. Lawrence, Jan. 17, 1997.
77Id.
78NIDA Obstructs Medicinal Marijuana Research, Pamphlet by Marijuana Policy Project
Foundation, Oct. 1996.
79Id.
17of the protocol in a manner similar to Dr. Leshner's. Proponents also claim that
prior to the early 1980s NIDA did not require researchers to submit requests in
this manner.80
The major point of dispute between Dr. Abrams and Dr. Leshner is the extent
to which the proposed protocol will demonstrate marijuana's eectiveness in 40
patients suering from AIDS Wasting Syndrome.81 Dr. Leshner contends that
the study sample is too small to yield statistically relevant data regarding the
relationship between dose and eect. Dr. Leshner also questions the lack of
dosing control.82
With respect to the latter, Dr. Abrams contends that it was not mandatory
for patients in the Marinol trials to receive the same dose each day.83 Rather,
patients were evaluated if they used any amount over 75% of their daily al-
lotment of medication.84 He also argued that patients who smoke marijuana
can self-titrate, and would be required to provide a daily record of the quantity
smoked and time of day smoked.85
Dr. Abrams has rebutted the former argument by stating that neither he nor
the FDA expect this initial study to produce a statistically signicant dierence
in weight gain among those who receive high and medium potency marijuana,
80Id.
81Rick Doblin, NIDA Blocks Medical Marijuana Research,
http://www.maps.org/mmj/ricklesh.html (visited Jan. 12, 1997).
82Id. and Dr. Leshner's Letter to Dr. Abrams, http://www.maps.org/mmj/leshner.html
(visited Jan. 12, 1997).
83Id.
84Rick Doblin, NIDA Blocks Medical Marijuana Research,
http://www.maps.org/mmj/ricklesh.html/
85Id.
18as compared to those groups which receive low potency marijuana or the THC
capsule. Rather, the protocol is intended only to evince trends suggesting mar-
ijuana's usefulness which hopefully will merit approval to conduct larger stud-
ies.86
Descriptions of FDA regulations concerning Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III
clinical studies in humans to some extent lend support to Dr. Abrams argument
that he should begin with a smaller study. In Phase II, relatively small numbers
of patients are investigated intensively with specialized studies tailored to the
type of drug and the disease to be treated.87 In Phase III, hundreds and even
thousands of patients are investigated.88 However, it is apparent that the two
doctors have dierent interpretations of what constitutes a small initial study
and the degree of ecacy which needs to be demonstrated at this stage in the
research.
Part of the confusion might stem from the dierent objectives of NIDA
and FDA when approving an Investigational New Drug (IND). FDA's review
of Phase 1 submissions focuses on determining the safety of these investiga-
tions, whereas review of Phases 2 and 3 submissions concentrate increasingly on
the quality of the study and the prospects for eventual New Drug Application
86 Id.
87 Hutt & Merrill, Food and Drug Law 516 (1991).
88 Id.
19(NDA) approval.89 NIDA, to the contrary, because its marijuana resources are
limited, may desire greater proof of ecacy at an earlier stage in the process
than the FDA. The diculty is that wherein Dr. Abrams classies his study
as being in the beginning stages, and thus he just desires to nd a general
trend that marijuana is helpful to AIDS patients, his study does provide the
drug to diseased persons which is technically a Phase II research project. Thus,
although the FDA may not object to the study producing only general, sta-
tistically irrelevant data, NIDA's sources are being absorbed and NIDA wants
the research to get at the heart of resolving the eectiveness of marijuana for
the AIDS Wasting Syndrome. The degree to which a research protocol must
be designed to demonstrate the drug's usefulness should be consistent between
FDA and NIDA. This will require intra-agency negotiations.
This description of the dispute between Dr. Abrams and Dr. Leshner facilitates
an understanding of whether the DEA has been correct in its refusal to grant
Dr. Abrams a license. Mr. Gene Haislip, Deputy Assistant Administrator,
Oce of Diversion Control, is the DEA ocial designated authority over the
issuance of DEA Schedule I licenses.90 He has sent to the FDA documentation
of his concerns with Dr. Abrams research, scientic and otherwise.91
According to 21 U.S.C.A. x 823(f) the Attorney General, who in these mat-
ters has delegated her authority to the DEA Administrator, may refuse to license
8921 C.F.R. x 312.22(a) (1996).
90 Rick Doblin, The Medicinal Use of Marijuana, http://www.maps.org/news-
letters/v5n1/abrams.html (visited Jan. 12, 1997).
91 Id.
20a researcher who has FDA approval of his protocol only if issuance of the license
would violate section 824(a).
Registration for the purpose of bona de research with controlled substances
in schedule I by a practitioner deemed qualied by the Secretary [of HHS] may
be denied by the Attorney General only on a ground specied in section 824(a)
of this title.92
Of the factors listed in 824(a) only the fourth seems applicable to the dis-
cussion of the legalization of medicinal marijuana. That factor states that a
license to distribute a controlled substance may be suspended or revoked by the
Attorney General upon a nding that the registrant- has committed such acts
as would render his registration under section 823 of this title inconsistent with
the public interest as determined under such section.93
Although the CSA generally encourages the FDA and the DEA to work to-
gether to regulate controlled substances, section 823(f) does not give the DEA
ocial latitude to deny a license because he disagrees with scientic aspects of
the protocol. Hence, only if Mr. Haislip's other grounds for disapproval involve
a fear that Mr. Abrams proposal is somehow inconsistent with the public inter-
est would he have a legal basis for objection. In fact this is the argument the
government is currently using to denounce the California state law legalizing
medicinal marijuana.94
Both the federal government's response to Dr. Abrams and the complete cessa-
9221 U.S.C. x 823(f) (1994).
93 21 U.S.C.A. x 824(a)(4) (1994).
94General Barry R. McCarey, Director of the Oce of National Drug Con-
trol Policy, Administration Rejects Use of Marijuana For Medicinal Purposes,
http://www.marijuana.org/dw3.htm (visited Jan. 12, 1997).
21tion of the IND Compassionate Access Program could be categorized as catalysts
which helped to ignite the November 5, 1996 passage of California's Proposi-
tion 215 Medical Marijuana Initiative by 56 to 44 percent. However it must be
noted that there was already existing in that state a breadth of strong willed
grassroot individuals and organizations including Dr. Abrams and Californians
for Medical Rights.
A study of the California initiative will enhance the discussion of how federal
agencies and federal courts fulll their duty to uphold federal statutory law, and
permits some introductory speculation as to how they will work to enforce the
U.S. Constitution.
The California initiative, entitled Compassionate Use Act (ACT) of 1996, as-
serts,
...that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana
for medical purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate and has
been recommended by a physician... 95
Here to recommend is not to prescribe as pharmacies may not shelve what
is still an illegal Schedule I drug. Furthermore, although the statute does list
the usual illnesses for which marijuana has been considered helpful (cancer,
anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, and migraine), a
guide distributed by the Californians for Medical Rights warns that an individ-
ual is not protected under the Act simply because he or she has a mentioned
95 California Health and Safety Code Section 1. Section 11362.5.
22illness.96 Rather a doctor must have specically recommended the drug.97
Other noteworthy aspects of the initiative include the fact that patients and
their primary caregivers may possess and cultivate marijuana.98 Yet although
they may be arrested, they cannot be prosecuted by state authorities. Doctors
who have recommended marijuana for medical purposes may not be punished
or denied any right or privilege for doing so. The Act also prohibits any pa-
tient from engaging in conduct that endangers others, such as driving under
the inuence, and the Act prohibits the diversion of marijuana for nonmedical
purposes.
California Attorney General Dan Lungren has admitted that an initiative which
receives a majority of the popular vote can only be changed by another vote of
the people. Our job is to correctly apply the 'medicinal use' law as narrowly as
possible { as close as possible to what the voters' intentions were, conceded Mr.
Lungren. Yet he also has acknowledged that because the law is so loosely writ-
ten it is dicult to determine exactly what is within and outside the scope of
legality.99 He has therefore concentrated his eorts on ensuring that marijuana
is sold exclusively for medicinal purposes, working with associations such as the
California Medical Association with respect to usage of marijuana by children
under Proposition 215, and declaring that the physician working in an incarcer-
96Californians for Medical Rights, Proposition 215 and You: A Guide for Medical Mari-
juana Patients and Others, http://www.prop215.org/brochur1.html (visited Jan. 14, 1997).
97Id.
98California Health and Safety Code Section 1. Section 113362.5(d).
99 News Release{ AG Dan Lungren, California Dept. of Justice,
http://www.prop215.org/allzone2.html (visited Jan. 14, 1997).
23ation facility independently determines whether an inmate should be provided
marijuana, consistent with facility security policies.100
Much of the federal response has come from General Barry R. McCarey,
Director of the Oce of National Drug Control Policy. His four objectives are
as follows:
1. Maintain eective enforcement eorts within the framework created by
the Federal Controlled Substance Act and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act;
2. Ensure the integrity of the medical-scientic process by which substances are
approved as safe and eective medicines;
3. Preserve federal drug-free workplace and safety programs; and
4. Protect children from increased marijuana availability and use.101
When outlining these principles he proclaimed two major White House con-
cerns, the illicit distribution of marijuana under the pretext of medical need,
and easier access to controlled substances by minors.102
The Department of Justice has sought to protect these concerns by suggest-
ing that physicians who prescribe or recommend (a newly enacted Arizona law
has sanctioned prescriptions) Schedule I controlled substances may have their
licenses revoked under 21 U.S.C. x 824(a).103 Of the ve factors listed as basis
for revocation, the fourth is relevant for a discussion of conicting state and
federal laws, as this is the section of the Code the Justice Department asserts
100Id.
101 Administration Rejects Use of Marijuana For Medicinal Purposes,
http://www.marijuana.org/dw3.htm (visited Jan. 12, 1997).
102 Id.
103Id.
24as supporting its position.
A registration pursuant to section 823 of this title to manufacture, distribute,
or dispense a controlled substance or a list I chemical may be suspended or
revoked by the Attorney General upon a nding that the registrant...
(4) has committed such acts as would render his registration under section
823 of this title inconsistent with the public interest as determined under such
section.104
Again, child susceptibility to drug abuse and public safety, both on the high-
way and in the workplace, constitute the public interest. To what extent will
the government be able to protect these interests under the federal statute using
principles of administrative law and/or the U.S. Constitution?
Insofar as marijuana is still a Schedule I drug legally it has no medicinal value
and will continue to be considered in this light as long as marijuana proponents
and opponents both stipulate that there currently exists no clinical research
which can pass the FDA new drug application (NDA) standard. Hence, under
21 U.S.C.A. x 823(f)(5) experimentation with marijuana by anyone other than
a DEA licensed researcher would be an illegal diversion.
The administrative law theory of deference to the agency would permit the
Justice Department, through DEA, to dene inconsistent with the public inter-
est as described above. In Leslie v. DEA, 92 F.3d 1192 (Ninth Cir. 1996) (an
unpublished opinion, the text of which is only available on Westlaw) the Court
held that when the DEA decides to revoke a license because the licensee has
acted inconsistent with the public interest, the standard of review is arbitrary
10421 U.S.C.A. x 824(a) and x 824(a)(5) pamphlet supplement (1996).
25and capricious.
We may not substitute our judgment for that of the agency. We must con-
sider only whether the agency's decision was based upon a consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.105
Although the ruling court declared that this case has no precedential value,
the decision hinges on a well known legal principle and is an indication of the
Court's opinion in this area.
Humphreys, M.D. v. DEA, 96 F.3d 658, 661 (Third Cir. 1996), was a li-
cense revocation case which turned on the denition of inconsistent with the
public interest. Although the Court asserted that the DEA bears the burden
of proving that a registration would not be in the public interest, a court must
uphold any reasonable agency construction of a statute it is entrusted to enforce.
In Humphreys the DEA did not suciently bear its burden. The
doctor's alleged violation was the prescribing of drugs to his patient using an-
other person's name in order to safeguard his patient's privacy. The Court held
that it is common and acceptable practice for the doctor to take such action
when the patient is a public gure.106 Illicit use of a Schedule I drug has never
been common and acceptable practice.
Public safety and concern for child development are deemed reasonable in Amer-
ican culture, thus there is a greater likelihood that the government will have met
its burden of proof. Marijuana proponents of course would argue that a child
105Leslie v. DEA, 92 F.3d 1192 (Ninth Cir. 1996).
106Id. at 662-663.
26can learn the dierence between the proper and improper use of a drug. Edu-
cation and individual will power could reduce the chances of car and workplace
accidents. Patients will die a more rapid death if marijuana is denied them.
To this the government would argue that there already exist approved drugs
(discussed above) which satisfy the same needs without the negative side af-
fects. If price is a diculty, there are government programs such as Medicaid
to assist. The government would rather pay for a safe form of treatment than
approve a drug which is less benecial.
On January 14, 1997 medicinal marijuana proponents, supported by Califor-
nians for Medical Rights and the American Civil Liberties Union, led a class
action suit against the U.S. Government in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California. They seek injunctive relief for patients and
physicians who have been threatened with prosecution and revocation of federal
prescription drug licenses.107 Named as defendants are: General McCarey, as
Director of the Oce of National Drug Control Policy, Thomas A. Constan-
tine, as Administrator, United States Drug Enforcement Administration, Janet
Reno, as Attorney General of the United States, and Donna Shalala, as Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services. Plaintis include: Dr. Marcus Conant, Dr.
Donald Northfelt, Dr. Arnold Le, Bay Area Physicians for Human Rights, and
Being Alive: People with AIDS/HIV Action Coalition, Inc.
Although the brief provides a detailed discussion of the numerous diseases for
107Plaintis' Brief at 17-18, Canant (1997).
27which marijuana has provided relief and gives anecdotal testimonies of patients
who have been treated, the proponents assert only one legal argument.
This class action seeks a declaration that physicians and patients have the
right, protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution, to communicate
in the context of a bona de physician-patient relationship, without government
interference or threats of punishment, about the potential benets and risks of
the medical use of marijuana.108
It is not unusual for an attorney to assert one major theory in support of a
case. It is striking, however, that the attorneys for these plaintis add no legal
citations to precedents as supportive of their position, nor do they attempt to
explain and distinguish negative precedents.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), is the leading Supreme Court
case which addresses a defendant's First Amendment right to advocate illegal
action through speech. According to Brandenburg speech is not protected when,
...Such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action.109
A physician who has recommended the use of marijuana has encouraged
criminal conduct under federal law since possession of a Schedule I drug is an
oense. The plainti's brief itself, by asserting that doctors are worried about
the possible revocation of their licenses due to marijuana recommendations110,
is evidence that advocacy of marijuana use is likely to incite or produce [that]
action. If the defendants raise the Brandenburg argument in their reply brief it
108 Id. at 2.
109William B. Lockhart & Yale Kamisar, Constitutional Law Cases - Comments - Questions
657 (1996), citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
110Plaintis' Brief at 17-18, Conant (1997).
28is feasible that the court might rule in their favor.
Still, underlying the recommendation issue is the greater question of whether
marijuana has an acceptable medical use which the FDA should recognize. If
it does then the drug's Schedule I status does inhibit the doctor's ability to
speak truthfully to the patient. The issue of what is the truth concerning the
marijuana issue is one which can only be answered through unbiased research.
Until such research is permitted it is likely that the courts will decide whether the
DEA's notion of public interest is reasonable. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit addressed this issue in U.S. v. Rodriguez-Camacho,
468 F.2d 1220 (1972).
Congress has concluded that '..controlled substances have a substantial and
detrimental eect on the health and general welfare of the American people.'
Appellant urges that this assertion is inapplicable to marijuana. This is a mat-
ter, however, whose ultimate resolution lies in the legislature and not in the
courts. It is sucient that Congress had a rational basis for making its nd-
ings.111
This holding is signicant not only because of its content, but of equal im-
portance is the fact that it is a Ninth Circuit appellate opinion. Since medicinal
marijuana advocates led in California District Court, this opinion has set the
precedent which they must counterbalance.
In an E-mail message forwarded to top advocates, those involved in the suit
specied that they purposely rejected other possible Constitutional claims such
111U.S. v. Rodriguez - Camacho, 468 F.2d 1220 at 1222 (Ninth Cir. 1972).
29as due process, cruel and unusual punishment, and right to privacy.112
Nevertheless, it is worth reviewing those alternatives in relation to mari-
juana because they have already been addressed at the federal level, and the
court adjudicating the plaintis' claims will be aware of how one of its con-
stituents dealt with the contention that marijuana does not meet the criteria
for Schedule I substances.
That constituent was the District Court for the District of Columbia in
NORML v. Bell, 488 F.Supp. 123 (1980). Besides upholding the Congressional
classication of marijuana as Schedule I in the CSA, this Court also addressed
the right to privacy, equal protection, and cruel and unusual punishment as they
relate to marijuana.
In NORML v. Bell, NORML contested the provisions of the CSA which pro-
hibit the private possession and use of marijuana, the exact situation California
has legalized for persons with medical needs. With regard to privacy, the court
contended that such a right exists only in relation to specic, fundamental con-
stitutional guarantees.113 A right is fundamental if it is explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution. The Bell Court cited earlier cases to support
its holding that smoking marijuana is not Constitutionally protected because it
was used primarily as a recreational drug and few would believe they have been
deprived of something of critical importance if deprived of marijuana. 114
112E-mail message to Rick Doblin addressed Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief.
113NORML v. Bell,488 F.Supp. 123 at 131-132 (D.C. Dist. Ct. 1980).
114Id. at 133.
30Wherein this argument was plausible in early 1980, the evidence and strong
claims currently being made by medicinal marijuana proponents does seem to
undermine the court's assertion. If medicinal marijuana does provide relief not
achievable through any other source, and this relief prolongs the life of termi-
nally ill individuals, then the use of marijuana may indeed be a fundamental
right. Yet, until marijuana is rescheduled, legally it remains a substance with
no medical value and thus the Bell opinion would remain valid.
The Court also rejected NORML's equal protection challenge by asserting that
legislation which does not aect a fundamental right or a suspect class will not
be strictly scrutinized.115 That there is no fundamental right to smoke mari-
juana has already been addressed.
The Court did mention the phrase suspect classication but failed to explore it,
possibly because NORML did not allege that a specic group was discrimina-
torily harmed by marijuana's illegality. To the contrary, the recent California
lawsuit explicitly asserts that individuals with certain terminal and/or chronic
illnesses are being denied a benecial product because their physicians fear the
federal repercussions of making a recommendation. Could plaintis' attorneys
allege that their clients are a suspect class which has been discriminated against?
A law challenged by a suspect class must endure the highest level of scrutiny
115Id. at 134-135.
31by the reviewing court if it is to be upheld. To date the Supreme Court has
only accepted race and national origin as fully suspect classes meriting the
strictest scrutiny whereby a law must be closely tailored to serve a compelling
government interest if it is to remain valid.116 Gender and illegitimacy have
been granted intermediate scrutiny whereby any classication based upon these
characteristics must be substantially related to an important government objec-
tive.117 All other equal protection challenges have been resolved by the court
through a rational basis review.118
Ralph K. Winter, Jr. in his article Poverty, Economic Equality, and the
Equal Protection Clause, argues in part that because there is an enormous
amount of legislation to help the poor, the impoverished would not qualify as
a suspect class.119 The analogy could be drawn that the FDA and DEA have
worked together to approve a variety of other drugs and treatments which oer
the same relief as marijuana. This coupled with the fact that marijuana is de-
nied to everyone, serves as proof that the plaintis have not been discriminated
against.
Winters also asserts that common to each of the accepted suspect and semi-
suspect classes is an unalterable human quality.120 Poverty is not necessarily
116William B. Lockhart, and Yale Kamisar, Constitutional Law Cases - Comments
- Questions 1258 (1996); see also Richmond v. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) and
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
117Lockhart, Constitutional Law 1310 (1996); see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988)
and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
118Lockhart, Constitutional Law 1310 (1996).
119Lockhart, Constitutional Law 1321 (1996).
120Id.
32a permanent status and since individuals can sometime escape, that is another
reason why poverty should not be considered a suspect class.121 On the other
hand, most of the illnesses for which marijuana is useful are terminal. If research
demonstrated that this substance oered the best relief, one might argue that
those for whom marijuana has been benecial have become a suspect class, or
semi-suspect class because the government was denying only those persons the
best available and aordable medicine.
If courts do not view those requesting medical marijuana as a suspect or
semi-suspect class, the substance's Schedule I status will be upheld provided
there is a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. When engaged
in a rational relationship analysis the court presumes the legislature acted as
a reasonable person would. The statute can only be invalidated if no grounds
can be conceived to justify it.122 Given the cases already discussed which have
armed that Congress and the agencies have been rational in not varying the
marijuana classication, the equal protection argument would not be easily won
today.
NORML, in NORML v. Bell, also challenged punishment for possession of mar-
ijuana as a violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Court responded with an
explanation of the Supreme Court's framework for reviewing the fairness of a
criminal statute. First, the severity of the oense and the sentence is compared
121Id.
122NORML v. Bell, 488 F.Supp. 123 at 134-135 (Dist. Ct. D.C. 1980).
33both to penalties for other crimes in the same jurisdiction, and to penalties for
the same crime in other jurisdictions.123 Second, evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society, are the criteria used to assess the
fairness of the punishment in relation to the crime. However, in this democratic
society the Court assumes that the legislature's rules are representative of soci-
ety's evolving standards of decency.124
The legislature is not compelled to choose the least severe punish-
ment. Rather, as long as the penalty given is not cruelly inhumane or dispro-
portionate to the crime involved, the burden remains with the one who has
challenged the people's choice as it is established in the statute.125
The Bell Court held that the punishment for possession of marijuana did
not violate the Eighth Amendment's protection from cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. The one year incarceration period was not considered extreme when
compared to other possession related federal penalties.126 Since Congress still
controls the sanctions for substance abuse, it is not likely that a court today
would rule dierently on an Eighth Amendment claim.
Despite the numerous Constitution based precedents which disfavor the Cal-
ifornia plaintis there are two remaining avenues for a possible victory. The rst
123Id. at 142.
124Id.
125Id.
126Id. at 142.
34is based upon a January 8, 1997 decision of the San Francisco Superior Court.
Judge David A. Garcia agreed to lift the restraining order against San Fran-
cisco's Cannabis Club, an organization run by Dennis Peron which cultivated
and distributed marijuana cigarettes to individuals claiming a medical need.127
Although state charges are still pending against Peron for selling marijuana,
Judge Garcia referred to the Compassionate Use Act when he decided in favor
of the will of the people.128
The California Act does permit a primary caregiver to obtain and possess mar-
ijuana for a patient.129 However the state supreme court will ultimately have
to determine whether one man, Dennis Peron, can be the legal caregiver for
every terminally ill person in the San Francisco area whose physician has rec-
ommended marijuana.
The Act denes a primary caregiver as the individual designated by the...
[patient] who has consistently assumed responsibility for the housing, health
or safety of that person.130 One group of medical marijuana proponents, Cal-
ifornians for Medical Rights, asserts that family members, very close friend,
and roommates of patients t under this denition most readily.131 In one
of their publications they advise patients to be conservative in designating a
127Glen Martin, Medical Pot Users Light Up, San Francisco Chronicle,
http;//www.marijuana.org/ccc2.htm (visited Jan. 16, 1997); E-mail message to Rick
Doblin, Subject: Details on San Francisco Cannabis Cultivators Club Opening (Jan. 9,
1997).
128E-Mail to Rick Doblin, Subject: Details on San Francisco.
129California Health and Safety Code, Section 1. Section 11362.5(d).
130 Id.
131Californians for Medical Rights, Proposition 215 and You: A Guide for Medical Mari-
juana Patients and Others, http://www.prop215.org/brochur1.html.
35caregiver, and to place emphasis on the statutory phrase consistently assumed
responsibility, for they concede that it will be a judge who will decide each case
individually.132
If California's highest Court, which has the nal word on matters of interpreting
state law, does not deem Peron a valid primary caregiver then patients will have
to resort to cultivating their own small quantities of the drug, or continue to
purchase on the black market. Yet this could be a victory in disguise because
patients with the right to smoke and cultivate under California law cannot be
prosecuted in federal courts.133 Since the DEA, like all federal agencies, has lim-
ited resources that agency must decide whether searching for individual medical
marijuana users is the best allocation of its resources.
If, on the other hand, the California Supreme Court upholds Judge Garcia's
decision, that likewise would be favorable to the proponents with the exception
that the Compassionate Use Act did not legalize the sale of marijuana. Another
vote by the populous would then be needed to amend the statute to allow an
exception for pre-approved suppliers such as the Cannabis Club.
A claim of necessity is the other tactic available to medical marijuana ad-
vocates, and because it is a common law criminal defense it can be used by
patients in states without a favorable statute. The Superior Court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, in U.S. v. Randall, Criminal Docket No. 65923-75 (1976),
132Id.
133California Health and Safety Code, Section 1. Section 11362.5(b)(1)(B).
36was the rst court to accept such a defense. Robert C. Randall, a glaucoma
victim, had been arrested and charged with possession of LSD and marijuana
in violation of the District of Columbia Code. The court established a three
pronged necessity defense.
1. [The actor must have been] reasonably compelled by circumstances to
commit the proscribed act.
2. The actor must not have brought the compelling situation upon
himself.
3. The consequences the actor sought to avoid must have been
greater than the harm done to society.
The defendant satised each prong. First, although medical experts could
not determine the precise cause of the disease, neither they nor the government
alleged that the harm was self-inicted. The court then engaged in a balanc-
ing test weighing the government's interests against the individual's. Evidence
demonstrated that the 1937 Tax Act had emerged under economic pressure and
with very little to support its eects on smokers. At the time of this case Presi-
dent's Commission reports and data from the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare had determined that there was no conclusive scientic evidence of
resulting harm and allegations of chromosome damage, reduced immunity to
disease, and psychosis were unconrmed. In contrast to the government's weak
assertions the court readily admitted the importance of the individual's right to
protect his or her body, and cited Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as support
for this contention.
Although the Washington, Florida, and Idaho state courts have also permit-
37ted the necessity defense for medical marijuana, other state courts have rejected
the defense in an eort to present a united front with their legislatures which
have frowned upon use of the drug.134 For example, the New Jersey Supreme
Court ruled that because the legislature labeled marijuana a Schedule I drug
(states can reclassify according to a standard dierent from the federal, how-
ever doing so is merely a symbolic act since the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy
Clause guarantees that federal law trumps any state law conict) it had no in-
tentions for a medical use.135 The Georgia Court of Appeals ruled likewise.136
The majority of information discussed thus far has demonstrated how princi-
ples of constitutional and administrative law have worked together to halt any
signicant advancement toward a change in medical marijuana's status. Never-
theless, the movement should not be underestimated. In addition to California
and the state courts which have adopted the necessity defense in relation to
medical marijuana cases, Arizona and Massachusetts have also adopted laws
legalizing the medical use of the drug.
The Arizona initiative, entitled the Drug Medicalization, Prevention, and
Control Act of 1996, endorses legalization of all Arizona Schedule I drugs for
medical purposes despite the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission report that
marijuana use doubled among elementary school students between 1990 and
134Marijuana Policy Project Foundation, How Can a State Legislature Enable Patients to
Use Medicinal Marijuana Despite Federal Prohibition?, http://www.mpp.org/despite.html
(visited Jan. 7, 1997).
135 New Jersey v. Tate, 505 A2d 941 (1986).
136 Spillers v. Ga., 245 S.E.2d 54 (1978).
381993 and quadrupled among middle-school students during those years.137 To
counterbalance the seemingly liberal move, the law simultaneously requires that
a medical doctor must document that scientic research exists which supports
the use of the substance and must also obtain a written second opinion from
another medical doctor.138 Furthermore, the patient must be seriously or ter-
minally ill. Yet another factor which helps to ensure that only medical uses
are permitted is the requirement that any person convicted of a violent crime
committed while under the inuence of a controlled substance must serve his or
her sentence and will not be eligible for parole.139
Compassion for suering persons was the motivating spirit behind the initiative
measure. Imbedded in the Arizona law is the following,
Thousands of Arizonans suer from debilitating diseases such as glaucoma,
multiple sclerosis, cancer, and AIDS, but cannot have access to the necessary
drugs they need. Allowing doctors to Prescribe Schedule I controlled substances
could save victims of these diseases from loss of sight, loss of physical capacity,
and greatly reduce the pain and suering of the seriously ill and terminally
ill.140
Compassion also appears to have been one of the driving forces behind the
August 8, 1996 Massachusetts law enacted by the legislature.141 State public
health commissioner David Mulligan has stated, The ethics have to be thought
through...If this reduces pain and enables people to keep food down, can we
137Arizona Proposition 200: Drug Medicalization, Prevention, and Control Act of 1996,
Section 2 Findings and Declarations.
138Id. at Title 13 Chapter 13 x 13-3412.01.
139Id. Title 41, Chapter 11 x 41 -1604.14.
140Id. Section 2. Findings and Declarations.
141Marijuana Policy Project, How Can a State Legislature Enable Patients to Use Medicinal
Marijuana Despite Federal Prohibition?, http://www.mpp.org/despite.html (visited Jan. 7,
1997).
39reasonably withhold it?142
Although the new law does not enable doctors to write prescriptions, nor
does it explicitly endorse a doctor recommendation of marijuana, it does grant
a prima facie defense to a charge of possession of marihuana.143 The person
asserting the defense, if certied by the state, should be shielded from pun-
ishment.144 In addition the statute establishes a medical marijuana research
program, which also has not been funded by NIDA.145 Nevertheless, state of-
cials have vowed to ask that federal government agencies not frustrate the
state's attempts to study marijuana's medical validity.146
In addition to California, Arizona, and Massachusetts which have legalized med-
ical marijuana in various forms, since the 1970s, 24 states have passed legislation
creating sate-run research programs for marijuana alone or in combination with
synthetic THC.147 Although in six states these laws have expired, and in ve
others they have been repealed148, overall medical marijuana proponents have
captured the attention of many within the nation.
Thus far judicial precedent has severely constrained their progress through
142Richard A. Knox, Mass. Oers Rules Today On Marijuana as Medicine, The Boston
Globe, A1, Jan. 21, 1997.
143MA ST 94C x 34 (1996).
144Richard A. Knox, Mass. Oers Rules Today on Marijuana, The Boston Globe, A1, Jan.
21, 1997.
145Id.
146Id.
147 Marijuana Policy Project, How Can a State Legislature Enable Patients to Use
Medicinal Marijuana Despite Federal Prohibition, http://www.mpp.org/despite.html.
148Id.
40administrative law principles and Constitutional interpretation. While it is true
that the higher level courts may continue to uphold the status quo, our sys-
tem is one of checks and balances. Thus the Chief Executive and his branch
agencies should not rely wholly on the Courts to support their position. For if
the legalization movement continues to spread this will transfer into constituent
pressure on congressional representatives, and one must remain cognizant that
Congress has the ultimate authority to reclassify a Schedule I drug.
The issue of medical marijuana will involve dicult decision making which will
raise the question, what is the American public interest? Of course it is dicult
to deny the terminally ill a supply of what they believe to be the best medica-
tion. However, the research is not conclusive as to whether medical marijuana
actually is the wonder drug some claim it to be.
There are harmful side aects, but that issue becomes dierent when the pa-
tients are terminally ill. Even the decision to research is complicated because
if marijuana does have medicinal value one must become concerned about its
availability to the nation's youth. If research is to be done, perhaps a few large
private research institutions could conduct the studies with tight government
supervision.
Just as each of the thirteen American colonies needed one another to ward
o British oppression, the fty states need leadership in this area as well. That
leadership does not necessarily have to be a closed mind to medical marijuana
research, however the legalization of a substance which has been deemed harmful
41for so long without knowing its ultimate aects could be self-destructive.
42